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Web Services Security (WS-Security) provides a set of standards as a basis for the development of security models to address 
the handling of SOAP messages.  Scenarios explicating these standards have limited their focus to confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity. The issue of delivery assurance in a low trust scenario has not been raised or addressed. In this 
article, we demonstrate the current standards are adequate to develop a security model that incorporates delivery assurance 
for a transaction model. Based on the lessons learned in this exercise, we argue that a theoretical approach is needed to 
establish the adequacy of the standards and develop appropriate security models. We suggest trust among participants and 
flexibility of information flow as two dimensions for inclusion in the theoretical analysis. More work is needed to determine 
if additional dimensions are needed to completely characterize the transaction models (scenarios). 
Keywords 
Web Services, WS-Security, security, delivery, assurance, confirmation, theoretical approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
Web Services environments and transaction models are expected to facilitate exponential growth in e-commerce and business 
to business (B2B) productivity, due to their ability to decrease business costs and increase consumer choice.  A supporting 
cast of enabling technology has already been developed, most notably eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 
2004) and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) (Gudgin et al., 2003).  However, it is generally accepted that the inclusion 
of Web Services into current business models will not occur until security-related concerns are resolved. 
The increased security risks associated with Web Services are mostly due to changes in the source of threat and asset 
exposure. In the conventional Internet environment, the primary sources of the threat are external, i.e., threats to the message 
during transit by parties unassociated with the transaction. In Web Services, there may be an additional source of threat, i.e., 
internal threat. Messages designated from one party to another may be routed through an intermediary. Hence, in scenarios in 
which there is there is low trust among participants, it is necessary to incorporate mechanisms to prevent tampering with, or 
deletion of, the message by the intermediary, i.e., safeguard against threats from parties who are a part of the overall 
transaction. The change in asset exposure arises because Web Services could allow untrusted communications into trusted 
networks.   
Efforts  to address new security concerns include the development of specifications, such as WS-Security, WS-
SecurityPolicy, WS-Trust, WS-SecureConversation and so on. Additional standards (e.g. XML encryption, XML digital 
signature, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), XML Access Control Markup Language) address the finer 
granularity of requirements for security implementation. Collectively, these are intended to provide the basis for “a standards-
based architecture that is comprehensive yet flexible enough to meet the Web services security needs of real businesses” 
(IBM and Microsoft, 2002). 
                                                          
1 Author names are in alphabetical order. All authors have contributed equally. 
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“At the same time, every customer and every Web service has its own unique security requirements based upon their own 
particular business needs” (IBM and Microsoft, 2002).  While some attention has been paid to the development of specific 
solutions for specific business needs, much work remains to be done in this area.  One issue that has not received much 
attention is delivery assurance.  Delivery assurance can be divided into two categories: assurance in spite of technology 
failures and assurance against the acts of untrustworthy human actors.  Vendor proprietary reliable messaging protocols and 
the proposed reliable HTTP protocol (HTTP-R) address delivery assurance in spite of technology failures (Todd et al., 2002).  
These solutions are designed to ensure that the message is delivered only once, and the sender is notified in the event the 
receiver does not receive the message.  It should be noted that these solutions are designed for two-party transactions, 
whereas most web-services scenarios involve multi-party transactions.  Actions of untrustworthy human actors include: (a) 
repudiation by sender, (b) repudiation by receiver, (c) data alteration by an actor, and (d) deletion of messages designated for 
others by an intermediary.  Repudiation by sender is addressed by the use of XML digital signature (Mactaggart, 2001).  
Repudiation by receiver is handled by WS-Non-Repudiation (Gravengaard, 2003).  XML encryption along with hash 
algorithms enables the detection of data alteration or partial content deletion, but not entire message or element-level 
deletions within SOAP envelopes, i.e., the deletion of the content from A to D by intermediary B or C.  
In this article, we have two goals. First, we provide a security model that incorporates delivery assurance in a particular 
scenario, as a first step in understanding issues related to delivery assurance and the development of more generalized 
solutions. Second, we propose a theoretical approach to the study of security issues. Towards this end, we offer two 
theoretical dimensions as a starting point.  
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
Web Services 
The term, Web Services, encapsulates functional ideals that characterize a new way of conducting business via the Internet.  
While definitions vary, the common thread is that Web Services represent a conceptual idea more than a clearly defined 
entity or finite set of technologies.  Gartner defines Web Services as, “loosely coupled software components that interact with 
one another dynamically via standard Internet technologies” (Myerson, 2002).  Forrester research defines them as, 
“automated connections between people, systems, and applications that expose elements of business functionality as a 
software service and create new business value” (Myerson, 2002).  In short, web services refer to a set of applications that 
work in heterogeneous, highly dynamic environments, wherein cross-platform interoperability is achieved via common 
communication standards (i.e. Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)), flexible messaging languages (i.e. XML), and 
ubiquitous protocols (i.e. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)).  Web services models display the following characteristics: 
• Relationships between the partners are dynamic, transient, and not established via a priori agreements; 
• Middleware and common messaging protocols are leveraged to remove client-server code dependencies; 
• Transactions often occur via asynchronous messaging, rather than traditional session-based connections;  
• Transactions may include a third party intermediary (or multiple intermediaries);  
• Transactions leverage peer-to-peer architectures (Westbridge, 2002, 2003); and 
• Architectures require decentralized administration (Westbridge, 2002, 2003) 
Web Services Security Requirements 
Incremental security requirements in Web services, beyond the traditional needs of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
access control and non-repudiation, arise from the transient nature of the relationships between the participants. First, in 
traditional Internet-based business environments, the threats to security are from external sources, i.e., parties unrelated to the 
transactions. In Web services environments, since messages are often routed through intermediaries, threats from internal 
sources may also exist. These raise the need for end-to-end security and element level confidentiality. Second, threats from 
internal sources go beyond the customary confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity issues. There is a possibility that 
messages intended for other recipients may be fully or partially deleted by intermediaries. Third, communications related to 
Web services are allowed through firewalls of organizations as a matter of course. This provides a point of entry for 
malicious agents, like viruses into organizational networks. 
Web Services Security Specifications and Technology 
In recognition of the need for new security model enabling standards and technology, IBM™, Microsoft™, and VeriSign™ 
drafted the Web Services Security (WS-Security) specification in 2002 (Kaler, 2002).  Using WS-Security and supporting 
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specifications mentioned in this article, businesses are able to develop basic security models to fit various scenarios and 
environments.  Such models emphasize message integrity, element-level confidentiality, single-message authentication, and 
extensible security token exchange in Web Services transactions.  The stated goals of the specification are to ensure that an 
antagonist cannot read or modify SOAP messages without authorization, nor can they forge SOAP messages that will be 
processed as if authentic.  Its drafters facilitate interoperability in a security context by outlining a set of SOAP extensions 
that provide security token information, handle digital signatures (including signatures for canonicalized data), and 
encryption/decryption mechanisms for body blocks, header blocks, or any combination thereof. 
Unfulfilled Security Requirements 
WS-Security is limited in scope, and its authors acknowledge that it does not establish a security context or authentication 
mechanisms that require multiple exchanges, nor does it facilitate key exchange and derived keys, nor does it address how 
trust is established or determined.  The first two are addressed via the WS-SecureConversation specification (Kaler and 
Nadalin, 2002), while trust establishment is facilitated in part by WS-SecurityPolicy (Hondo and Kaler, 2003) and WS-Trust 
(Kaler and Nadalin, 2002) specifications.  WS-Security is limited in scope in other ways important to e-commerce, including 
assurance that messages are delivered to intended recipients when intermediaries are involved in the transaction.         
Delivery Assurance of Targeted Content 
In a typical Web service scenario, several participants (A, B, C and so on) are all involved in a transaction, but have different 
roles and therefore differing needs regarding sending and receiving various parts of the overall communication.  Assuming 
participant A is the initiating party to the transaction, A may have some information for B and different information for C—
some or all of which may be private (not privy to B).  Additionally, B may have its own unique information to send to C in 
addition to forwarding information from A (whether or not B has access to the message from A to C).  WS-Security and 
supporting specifications and technologies protect the confidentiality and integrity of A’s message to C, but fail to prevent B 
from deleting A’s message to C entirely.  Participant C would have no way of knowing whether requisite information from 
the transaction was supposed to have come from A instead of B, nor any way of knowing whether or not C should have 
received supplemental information from A through B.  This concern becomes significant when there is limited trust among 
participants. 
Consider the hypothetical case of an individual wanting a vacation package that includes airline flights, hotel 
accommodation, and excursions arranged by a travel agent.  Currently, the customer receives limited options for each of these 
services from the travel agent, and makes a choice.  Travel agents often bundle services from companies that provide the best 
financial incentives to the travel agent.  In a web-services scenario, the customer could efficiently insist that the travel agent 
contact specific airlines, hotels and tour companies, in order to compare prices with the standard travel agent package.  Each 
actor in the sequence has a reason to delete messages intended for the next receiver. The travel agent may have special 
arrangements with a particular airline, and may therefore not wish to the customer to see lower quotes. Likewise, special 
arrangements may exist with hotels and tour companies. The customer does not wish to contact the airline, hotel or tour 
company directly because each actor has a role, or specific information that has to be passed on to the next actor.  The travel 
agent’s role is to put the package together; the airline has to confirm availability dates and pass the arrival/departure 
information to the hotel, which in turn has to pass on location information to the tour company to ensure that the tour 
company serves that area.  Further, the customer may not wish the airline to know what type of room is being requested, or 
the hotel to know the types of tours that the customer is interested in.  
This scenario is not an exemplar of a realistic scenario, based on current business processes.  Instead it reflects what could be 
implemented in a web services environment to provide options to the customer, options, which are not currently feasible 
without a lot of effort on the part of the customer.  Whether such a scenario is realistic or not, it reflects an extreme in terms 
of requirements. A solution, which can handle the extreme requirements, will be able to handle more relaxed requirements. 
Proposed Solution 
Literature Review 
Little has addressed delivery assurance in Web Services transactions characterized by low levels of trust among participants. 
WS-Security, WS-SecurePolicy, WS-Trust, and WS-SecureConversation do not address non-repudiation in the form of 
message delivery assurance.  The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) addresses the issue of communicating with third 
party or multiple intermediaries in its discussion of Web Services architectures (Haas and Orchard, 2002).  The third party 
intermediary scenario is built around a buyer-seller scenario in which the third party intermediary is a marketplace.  In this 
scenario, buyers and sellers establish trusted relationships with the marketplace, which then brokers deals between them.  
Current security mechanisms fulfill the security needs in this type of scenario, not to mention the fact that the marketplace is 
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motivated to act in a forthright manner since their relationships with buyers and sellers is key to their continued business 
viability.  Such motivation cannot be assumed in a low trust environment and not all relationships involving third party 
intermediaries will be established a priori. 
In the scenario of multiple intermediaries, the W3C proposes a solution wherein non-repudiation is achieved by 
intermediaries logging and signing routing header information in a persistent, presumably third party, database.  Such logging 
and signing is handled by a “Routing Logging Handler” on each SOAP node.  Such a model, however, only provides non-
repudiation at the message level.  It does not provide protection against, or, detection of, intermediaries removing content in 
its possession intended for a subsequent recipient.   
Introduction to Proposed Security Model 
The proposed security model is developed for a particular, if somewhat artificial scenario. We begin by describing the 
scenario and defining the terminology used in the security model. We outline the current approach to such a scenario and 
indicate the lack of delivery assurance. Then we explicate our security model for the same scenario, and how it addresses 
delivery assurance.  
Scenario  
Our discussion of the solution is based on the following scenario. The number of participants in the transaction is known, 
four in this case, A, B, C and D.  Participant A initiates the transaction. The information from A is passed along a known 
sequence, from A to B to C to D.  Participant A has distinct messages for each of the three other participants. The messages 
from A to each of the participants must be kept confidential from the others. Also, each participant must be assured of the 
integrity of the message and that it is authentically from A. Participant A needs to be sure that each of the participants 
receives A’s message (delivery assurance).   
At this point in time, we will assume that B does not have an independent message to transmit to C or D. 
Terminology 
We use the following terminology in our discussion: 
• The term “message” refers to the primary content that one party wishes to convey to another in its plaintext format. 
MAB represents the message from A to B. 
• The hashed version of the message is represented by HMAB. 
• The public key of A in the asymmetric encryption scheme is represented by PUKA. 
• The private key of A in the asymmetric encryption scheme is represented by PRKA. 
• The symmetric key shared by A and B is represented by SKAB.  
• A payload refers to an aggregation of components being sent from one party to another, which only the receiving 
party can access. Payload from A to B will be represented by PAB. A typical payload from A to B would include, 
MAB and HMAB encrypted with the PRKA for authentication, and then encrypted with PUKB for confidentiality. In 
addition to MAB and HMAB, other content may be included in the payload, as will be seen later in this article. 
Specific contents of payload will have to be specified in the security model. 
• The SOAP envelope from A to B will include PAB and will include payloads to other parties in the transaction in a 
multi-party transaction, i.e., PAC and PAD will also be present in the SOAP envelope from A to B. However, PAC and 
PAD will be encrypted so that B is not able to violate the confidentiality of communication between A and C, and, A 
and D.  
• The proof-of-completion token, TDA, is the token that the end-point D returns to A to indicate that the transaction is 
complete. 
Basic Security Model Currently Employed 
Current security models rely on the trust among the participants. The basic solution uses three different payloads, one for 
each of the recipients. The payload from A to B is as follows: [PUKB{PRKA(MAB + HMAB)}]. In words, the message from A 
to B (MAB) and its hash digest (HMAB) are encrypted using A’s private key (PRKA), and then again using B’s public key 
(PUKB). Confidentiality is assured, since the message must first be decrypted with B’s private key (PRKB).  Authenticity is 
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established when A’s public key successfully decrypts at the next stage. Integrity can be verified with the hash digest. Similar 
payloads are created for C and D.  
Participant A creates a SOAP envelope, which contains the three payloads, one for B, one for C, and one for D, and sends the 
envelope to B. Participant B opens the envelope, extracts the payload from A to B, and reconstitutes the SOAP envelope with 
the payloads from A to C and A to D, and forwards it to C. The process continues until the payload for the final recipient is 
delivered. 
In the process of opening the SOAP envelope from A and reconstituting it for transmission to C, B can delete either the 
payload to C or D or both. It is possible that the characteristics of the transaction are such that the absence of participation 
from one of the participants may be noticed. It is also possible that the deletion may go totally undetected. In essence, 
detection of the failure of delivery is dependent on chance, or some other manual, human-in-the-loop effort to confirm all 
messages were delivered and received as intended.  
Proposed Solution2: Nested Symmetric Keys Security Model 
The proposed solution is based on three principles. First, a sequential dependence is created between adjacent intermediaries 
in the sequence. The nature of the dependency is such that each intermediary can view his/her payload only if he/she has 
access to the appropriate symmetric key used to encrypt his/her message. This symmetric key can be provided only by the 
actor immediately ahead of him/her in the sequence. Second, the final participant (end-point) must return a “proof-of-
completion” token to the party initiating the transaction, a token that has to be enclosed in the payload for the final participant 
(also referred to as end-point) from the initiator. Third, the mandatory payload principle requires that A must have a payload 
for each of the subsequent participants. In the case where there is no message, a null message must be sent. Sequential 
dependence, proof-of-completion token and mandatory payloads will ensure that no participant can be deliberately or 
accidentally left out of the sequence without immediate detection.   
Next we describe our solution. The SOAP envelope from A to B will include three payloads: A?B, A?C, and A?D. The 
three payloads are shown symbolically first and then described in words. 
a) Payload from A to B: PUKB[PRKA {SKAB(MAB ) + HMAB }+{ SKAB }]+  
PUKB[{PUKC(SKAC+{PUKD(SKAD+TDA)})}] 
b) Payload from A to C: PUKC[PRKA {SKAC(MAC) + HMAC}] 
c) Payload from A to D: PUKD[PRKA {SKAD(MAD) + HMAD}] 
 
The payload from A to B has two components. In the first component, the message (MAB) is encrypted using a symmetric key 
(SKAB). The encrypted message along with the hash digest, HMAB is signed using the private key of A (PRKA). The first 
component also has the symmetric key (SKAB) used to encrypt the message from A to B. The second component has the 
symmetric key for A to D messages (SKAD) and the proof-of-completion, TDA, encrypted with D’s public key (PUKD). This is 
combined with the symmetric key for A to C messages (SKAC), and then encrypted with the public key for C. Each of the 
components is encrypted separately with the public key for B. 
 
The payload from A to C has only one component. The message MAC is encrypted with SKAC, which along with the hash 
digest, HMAC, is encrypted using the private key of A (PRKA), and then encrypted with the public key of C (PUKC). The 
payload from A to D is similar to the payload from A to C. 
 
Participant B, upon receiving the SOAP envelope will use its private key to decrypt the symmetric key and the authenticated 
message plus digest package. Upon accessing the encrypted message, B will use the symmetric key to get at the message. 
Participant B will also use its private key on the second component.  
 
The reconstituted SOAP envelope from B to C will include: 
a) The encrypted symmetric keys: PUKC(SKAC+{PUKD(SKAD+TDA)}) 
b) Payload from A to C: PUKC[PRKA {SKAC(MAC) + HMAC}] 
c) Payload from A to D: PUKD[PRKA {SKAD(MAD) + HMAD}] 
 
Participant C, upon receiving the SOAP envelope from B, will apply its private key to the encrypted symmetric keys and 
extract the symmetric key, and decrypt the payload, verify its authenticity, decrypt the message with the symmetric key and 
then verify its integrity. 
                                                          
2 The XML code for this scenario is available from Prof. Rao.   
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The reconstituted SOAP envelope from C to D will include: 
a) The encrypted symmetric keys: PUKD(SKAD+TDA) 
b) Payload from A to D: PUKD[PRKA {SKAD(MAD) + HMAD}] 
 
Participant D, upon receiving the SOAP envelope will decrypt the key, and access D’s message. The proof-of-completion 
token is also accessible, and can be returned to A, signed with D’s private key. 
 
Examination of the scheme will reveal that B cannot skip C, because C has to decrypt SKAD, before D can access it. If B 
deletes the message from A to C, and sends the SOAP envelope to C for the decryption of D’s symmetric key, the absence of 
a payload from A to C will alert C. If B deletes the message to D, once again C will be aware that a payload has been deleted. 
If C deletes the payload from A to D and the symmetric key package, the proof-of-completion token will be lost, and hence A 
will be alerted.   
 
Further examination will show that it is possible for B, or any other intermediary, to initiate a similar sequence of messages, 
and send it in parallel to A’s messages in the same SOAP envelopes, and be assured that the overall process is reliable and 
foolproof. Solutions can be similarly formulated for the 3-actor or n-actor scenarios. When only three actors are involved, 
several feasible solutions exist, including one analogous to the example shown for the 4-actor scenario.  
MODEL LIMITATIONS 
Some caveats are in order. First, we are focused on conceptually demonstrating technical feasibility of a solution. Our 
solution does not address organizational or social issues, which may still undermine the overall security of the system. 
Second, the solution is based on existing encryption technologies, in particular, the asymmetric key concept. The solution is 
only as sound as the technologies that are used in its development and the veracity of the infrastructure that facilitates it (i.e. a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)). Third, the model assumes that the initiator knows the number of participants and the 
sequence in which they must receive the messages.  We acknowledge that in the publish-find-bind scenario of web services, 
this assumption is easily challengeable.  We use it as a starting point for model development and agree that more complex 
scenarios will have to be addressed to provide significant practical value.  Fourth, the issue of low trust has only been 
partially addressed. Our solution is focused on providing safeguards against message deletion by internal sources. Our model 
does not address the threats arising from allowing untrustworthy participants access through the firewall.  Fifth, the proposed 
solution requires repeated encryption and decryption, and reconstitution of SOAP envelopes, which places demands on 
processing resources.  The goal in this article was to demonstrate that a feasible solution existed. Future research will have to 
examine ways improve the efficiency of processing. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
We selected one single transaction model (scenario) and developed a solution that ensures delivery assurance (or detection of 
its violation) without using a central repository. Security models for other transaction models can be developed and similarly 
examined, on an as-needed basis. From a practical perspective, this may be sufficient to further the development of Web 
services. From a theoretical perspective, the challenge is to demonstrate that the standards are sufficient to develop a solution 
for any transaction model.  
We propose a theoretical approach for consideration.  First, transaction models can be classified along some dimensions. In 
the segment following, we propose two dimensions. We are not sufficiently advanced in our research to make a categorical 
statement that the dimensions are adequate to completely specify transaction models. Second, we argue that security demands 
are more difficult to fulfill at one end of each dimension than the other. Hence, if security models can be developed for the 
extreme conditions, then it would be possible to claim, based on theoretical demonstration, that the existing standards are 
adequate to meet the security needs of Web services. 
Theoretical Dimensions 
In our example, we made two explicit assumptions: first, there was low trust among the participants, and second, that the 
number of participants and the sequence in which they receive the payloads were known, i.e., the information flow was 
inflexible. These constitute two of the dimensions that can guide the theoretical approach.  
Trust among participants 
In low trust situations, steps have to be taken against violations of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and deletion of 
payloads by participants in the transaction. Chance detection of data deletion is possible, but a secure system should 
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incorporate active mechanisms to detect deletion of payloads or abortion of the process sequence. Low or zero trust 
assumption makes stronger demands on security requirements. We argue that if a security solution can be formulated for all 
cases of zero trust, then theoretically, the security mechanisms incorporated into the current standards are sufficient to handle 
all transaction models.  
Flexibility of Information Flow 
Flexibility of information flow is a function of three factors: number of participants, linearity of transmission of messages, 
and predetermination of the sequence of transmission. The most complex case (highest flexibility of information flow) would 
be when the number of participants is not known at the beginning of the message transmission, i.e., intermediaries may 
introduce new participants into the group; the transmission of messages is non-linear, i.e., the same or different messages 
may be transmitted along different paths; the sequence of transmission is not known, i.e., the identity of the (n)th person 
receiving it is determined by the (n-1)th party, which determination is not known to the first (n-2) parties. Security models that 
can deal with high flexibility of information flow will be able to deal with situations of low flexibility in information flow.  
In the scenario that we considered, trust among participants was low (high security demands), but flexibility of information 
flow was low (low security demands). Thus, we have addressed a scenario with intermediate security demands. In terms of 
addressing the theoretical adequacy of the standards, one still needs to demonstrate that security models exist which can 
handle the need for high flexibility in information flow utilizing the current standards. 
We have articulated two theoretical dimensions. Further analysis is needed to examine if other relevant dimensions exist.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of Web services introduces of the need for delivery assurance. In this article, a security model for delivery 
assurance for a specific scenario was presented. Two dimensions, trust among participants, and, flexibility of information 
flow, were proposed as a starting point for a theoretical approach to examining the adequacy of existing security standards 
and mechanisms.   
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